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Pakistan has been in the news a lot lately. Unfortunately, it has generally been for
the wrong reasons. Regularly, there are horrific stories of suicide bombings killing
scores of civilians or armed attacks against military targets, but more often than
not innocent civilians going about their daily lives are the victims. The media -
western and Pakistani - generally blame these terrorist acts on the pakistani
Taliban. However, while reliable information about these religious extremists is
sketchy and not always reliable, a picture has begun to emerge about who the
Pakistani Taliban are and the extent of the militant threat to the stabilitv of
Pakistan.
This chapter argues that the growth of pakistani militancy and religious
extremism, which is principally, but not solely, based in the triLal areas, is the
result of the confluence and the mutual reinforcement of internal and external
factors. The intemal factors include: the poor govemance of pakistan,s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the socio-economic under-development of
FATA and its lack of political integration with the rest of the country, and the
domestic and foreign policies of successive central governments, civilian and
military. The external factors include: the presence in pakistan's western prov-
inces ofthe anti-Soviet mujahideen (freedom fighters) in the l9g0s, the establish-
ment of Al-Qaeda and raliban safe havens in FATA following the ousting of the
Afgian Taliban from power in october 2001, and washington,s political and
military strategies for dealing with these safe havens. I will also arsue that while
this Pakistani militancy is still dominated by the pashtuns, it hal increasingly
attracted militants and religious extremists from other parts of the country, partic-
ularly from southern Punjab. Iniportantly, there is also an increasing level of
cooperation between FATA-based militant groups and those from other parts of
the country whose previous focus used to be limited to Kashmir. Accordingly, this
Islamic militancy, or Talibanization, has now not only grown but it has spiiled out
of the tribal areas into the 'settled' areas of North west Frontier province (NwFp)
and other parts of the country, in particular in Karachi.t The long-term ramifica-
tions of this development are extremely worrisome for the future stability of
Pakistan, in particular, and the region, in general.
I will first briefly turn to the political administration and economy of FATA as
it is important to understand the context in which militancy has incubated over the
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last 60 years. I will then examine the four discreet political periods since 1947,specifically as they rerate to FATA, and analyse how developments during eachperiod assisted in the eventual 'creation, of the pakistani raiiban problem withwhich we are now confronted.
Political administration of tr'ATA
FATA, which is less than half the size of Tasmania with a population of over3 million, is composed oflwen tribal agencies. It is separated from Afghanistan
lv.ft: Durand Line, the 2,5O0-kilomeie border estabiished in lggzr--95 by theBritish colonial rulers of India between today,s pakistan and Afghanistan. whilethe Durand Line has been the defactoborder between pakistan ind Afghanistan,the government in Kabul has stilito recognize it officially.The British policy towards the tribal 6elt was based on a mix of persuasion,pressure and armed intervention. Britain instituted its ,Forward policy,, whichessentially consisted of 'paciffing' the tribes as far west as possible. This eventu_ally led to the 1897-98 Tribar wars. Realizing it would'rr"u", be possible tocompletely subdue the frontier tribes, the colonial administration decided toimplement the 'close Border policy', which involv"a 
".tuutirt 
irrg a numuer ortribal agencies, enclosed by a chain tf posts and cantonments, *t eie tt e pakhtuntribes would be allowed to govern their society according to their own laws andcustoms.2
To ensure control, London stationed troops in these agencies but arso grantedthese areas a semi-autonomous status in return for tribal icquies""rr"" a colonialru1e.3 This special status was codified in treaties that required z arirrs (trbarelders)to keep the borderpasses open for hade and strategic purposes in return for allow-ances and subsidies they could distribute among thiir tribes. Nevertheless, thehibal areas showed some of tre strongest anti-British resistance on the sub-continent during British rule.
- Following Partition in rg4T,thefounder and first Govemor-General ofpakistan,Mohammad Ali Jinnah, withdrew pakistan's army from FATA, but the govern-ment of Pakistan retained the colonial administrative and legal structures, codifiedin a special legal framework known as the Frontier crimes Regulations (FCR)I 901 . The FCR, which is still in force today, mixes haditional customs and normswith discretionary police, judicial and executive authority in the political agent(PA),8.y maintaining th3 Fc& the pakistan government chose to heat FATA,spopulation as separate from, and unequal to,-other pakistani citizens. The dealafter Partition was that Islamabad continued to provide allowances and subsidies,and in return the local tribes declared their loyaity to pakistan.
- 
The PA, a federal, and at times provincially recruited, bureaucrat heads thelocal administration of each ug"o"y. He is all_powerful. Backed by khas_sadarsa and levies (hibal militiar;, u-s *"tt as paramilitary forces that operateunder army control, the pA exercises a mix of extensive eiecutive, judicial andrevenue powers and has the responsibility of maintaining law ani order andsuppressing crime in the tribal areas. The pA grants tribal elders the status of
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malik (with the consent of the governor) on the basis of male inheritance. But the
PA can also arbitrarily withdraw, suspend or cancel malik statts if he deems
the individual is not serving the interests of the state. Like the British before them.
the Pakistan state rewards the loyal maliks with a special status, financial benefits
and other official rewards.s Needless to say, the state relies on the services and
collaboration of these maliks to administer FATA.
The FCRpreserves the Pakhtun tribal structure of jirga (council of elders),6 to
which the political agent can refer civil and criminal matters. Tltejirga ascertains
guilt or innocence after hearing the parties to a dispute and passes verdicts on the
basis of rauaj (custom). However, the PA retains ultimate authority. The political
agent initiates cases, appoints the jirga, presides over trials and awards punish-
ments without even the technical possibility of revision by a regular court of law.
This anachronistic legal arrangement continues to this day. So while FATA is
formally and legally a part of Pakistan, it more closely resembles a colony whose
population lives under laws and administrative arrangements that set it apart from
the rest of the country.
However, particularly relevant to Pakistan's involvement in the 'war on terror'.
are FCR clauses that empower the political agent to punish an entire tribe for
crimes committed on its territory by fines, arrests, property seizures and block-
ades.7 The political agent can order detention of all or any members of the tribe,
seize their property or block their access to the settled districts if he has 'good
reason' to believe that a tribe or its members are 'acting in a hostile or unfriendlv
manner', have 'failed to render all assistance in their-power, to help appreh"rri
criminals, 'connived at, or abetted in a crime' or 'suppressed evidence, of an
offence.
And while Pakistan's 1973 constitution guarantees fundamental rights for citi-
zens residing in the entire territory of the country, which includes the hibal areas,s
Article 247 (7) bars the highest courts of the land from exercising any jurisdiction
under the constitution in relation to a hibal area, unless parliament by law allows
it. Moreover, not only does FATA have no representation in NWFp's provincial
legislature, but while the constitution mandates representation for FATA in the
national parliament, the parliament cannot legislate on any matter concerning
FATA. This makes the FATA-elected members of parliament rather superfluous.
The economy of the tribal areas
FATA is one of Pakistan's most economically backward areas. Annual per capita
income is about $500, roughly half that of the very low national average; some 60
per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita public
development expenditure is reportedly one-third ofthe national average. Social
development indicators are shockingly low. The overall literacy rate is 17.42 per
cent compared with 56 per cent nationally. Male literacy is 29 per cent, female
literacy a mere 3 per cent, compared with 32 per cent nationally. There are only
4l hospitals for a population of 3.3 million. FATA has a per doctor rate of l:6,762
compared with the national l:1,359.e
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Natural resources, including minerals and coal, are under-exploited. It is the
most rural of all administrative units in the country. Most locals depend on subsis-
tence agriculture since there is little industrial development and few jobs. This
situation is made worse by the fact that about 15 per cent of the population is
between the ages of 15 and22.to
The PA is also FATA's chief development agent and planner; he is all-powerful
in that sphere as well. one of the PA's main instruments of economic control is
the granting of export and import permits for each agency. These export permits
are a much sought-after prize. Import permits for wheat and other basic necessi-
ties are another source of patronage distribution. Moreover, the political agent
approves and carries out developmental projects based on political and adminis-
trative considerations. There is 'almost no input from the local population or even
their parliamentary representatives in development initiatives'. I I
And to make things worse, the economy is completely distorted by the thriving
trade in arms, drugs, as well as other cross-border smuggling. These are a direct
consequence of the events in neighbouring Afghanistan. Poor law enforcement at
FATA's borders with Afghanistan encourages lucrative smuggling of luxury
consumer goods, causing significant revenue losses in uncollected duties and
taxes. Not only has the army done nothing or has been unable to stop this smug-
gling, but this trade provides the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts
in the FATA agencies with funds and arms. Most significantly, the army has not
prohibited the sale of guns and ammunition in FATA, which supplies the whole of
Pakistan.r2 Let me now turn to FATA's four political periods since partition, high-
lighting the events and issues which are relevant to understanding the develop-
ment of religious militancy in the tribal areas and beyond.
FATA's four political periods
The first period: 1947-1979
The inclusion of the NWFP and FATA in the Pakistan scheme following partition
was probably one of the most troublesome problems facing the departing British
administration. In NWFP there was the charismatic Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan,
nicknamed the 'Frontier Gandhi', who led a Muslim organization (IGudai
Khidmatgars - servants of God) which advocated the establishment of an inde-
pendent state for the Pakhfuns, i.e., Pakhhrnistan.rs This organization considered
Jinnah's Muslim League a British creation and opposed the idea of pakistan as
being a British invention. on the other hand, the Pakhtunistan scheme was ardently
supported by Afghanistan and the Congress Party. The Afghan authorities, not
recognizing the Durand Line, wanted the 'Pakistani' pakhtuns to either join
Afghanistan or create their own state of Pakhtunistan out of NWFp and parts of
Baluchistan but, interestingly, without including the Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan.
Kabul also demanded that Pakistan provide Afghanistan access to the sea by
giving it a special corridor through Baluchistan or creating a free Afghan zone in
Karachi.ra
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A second soluce of trouble for the Muslim League around the time of partition
came from the congress Ministry of Dr Khan sahib, the brother of the 'Frontier
Gandhi' in NWFP. Fearing that a congressled NwFp would opt not to join
Pakistan-to-be, the Muslim League put pressure on the British to call a refer-
endum, directly asking the people for their preference. The plebiscite, held in July
1947, only offered two choices: to join either India or pakistan; there was no
Pakhtunistan option. Dr Khan called for a massive boycott of the plebiscite. The
result was very close: of the 5l per cent of eligible voters who took part, 97 per
cent voted for Pakistan, i.e., only 50.5 per cent ofthe population voted in favour
ofjoining Pakistan.15 one week after Partition, Governor-General Jinnah sacked
Dr Khan, as allowed under the adapted Government of India Act, 1935, for fear
that the Pakhtunistan issue could be used by Afghanistan and India to create
domestic problems for Pakistan.t6 The new chief minister, Khan Abdul eayyum
Khan, used a heavy-handed approach towards the Pakhtuns, including calling out
the army and air force to suppress disturbances in the tribal areas.rT Already then
Pakistan's cenhal authority interfered in FATA's affairs.
Although the cenhal authorities, particularly under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (lgil_
77) intervened on a regular basis in the provincial affairs of NWFp, including
dismissing the Governor of NWFP on 12 February l973,t8 and arresting Wali
Khan, the National Awami Party (NAP) leader, on charges of secession, FATA
was generally left on its own. Interestingly, Afghan President Daud was close to
reaching an agreement with Bhutto in August I 976, which involved Afghanistan's
recognition of the Durand Line in return for the release of Pakhtun and Baluch
National Awami Party (NAP) leaders from Pakistani gaols. However, this agree-
ment was never implemented as Bhutto was toppled in 1977 by General Zia, who
subsequently released all imprisoned NAP leaders.
The second period: 1979-2001
With the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the political dynamics between
Islamabad and FATA took a dramatic turn. One of the main causes was the influx
of some 3 million Afghan refugees who fled the fighting. They mainly settled in
NWFP and FATA and this inevitably led to clashes between the local residents
and the refugees. Most disputes were, however, settled by the jirgas.
Complicating the refugee situation was the presence in the tribal areas of the
muj ahideen, the Western-supported anti-Afghan govemment guerrillas, who
launched their attacks against the Soviet and Afghan forces from Pakistani terri-
tory. Bin Laden was one of those mujahideen leaders then supported by the West.
And like the situation some 20 years later, the Pakistan government was unable or
unwilling to control the activities of these insurgents, with some of these rebel
groups establishing quasi-govemment enclaves in the tribal areas.re Not only did
the introduction of some $66 billion worth of weapons between 1978 and 1992
compound the gun culture in the country, but the presence of thousands of muja-
hideen led to the creation of a worldwide network of Afghan war veterans of all
nationalities. One of these organizations was Al-Qaeda.2o Many of these fighters
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would eventually return to Pakistan following the Taliban's ouster from power in
2001. It is interesting to note that,realizing the damage the presence of these
mujahideen were having on the local scene, ajirga of elders in FATA demanded
in 1985 that Islamabad recognize the soviet-backed government in Kabul and
return the refugees after having come to an acceptable agreement with the Afghan
authorities.2r
The embedding of the mujahideen in the tribal areas coincided with General
Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization process in Pakistan and Islamabad's close relationship
with saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both factors facilitated the increase in the polit-
ical clout of the mullahs and the Islamic parties. The conservative mullahs ,
progressively displaced the maliks as the principal tribal authority, and thus began
the breakdown of the traditional power structure in FATA.22 Along with this reli-
gious clout came the very substantial growth in the number of madrassas (reli-
gious schools) all over the country, including in the hibal areas.23 The most radical
of these madrassas spawned the mujahideen fighters, Afghans as well as
Pakistanis, who went to fight their jihad in Afghanistan and in Indian-held
Kashmir. Many of these madrassa-educated fighters are now part of the many
extremist religious groups and militants present in Pakistan. Given the low level
of socio-economic development in the tribal areas, it is not surprising that up to
80 per cent ofboys still go to these madrassas for their education today.
The overwhelming majority of the madrassas were, and still are, run by the
Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam (JUI), an Islamic party which believes in the revival of
Islamic values accordingto the shariah.The JUI is an ideological soulmate of the
Taliban. Not surprisingly, most of the founders of the Taliban went through these
JUI-run madrassas.Importantly, especially for its long-tenn consequences for the
stability of Pakistan, these madrassa.r also produced Pakistani religious extremists
who eventually turned against the very Pakistani state which had promoted
their growth. one of the most notable jihadisls to come out of these religious
schools was Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who founded Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat
Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1992. By late 1994 the TNSM movement was asserting
itself with thousands of armed supporters seeking to impose by force shariahlaw
in the Bajaur tribal agency of FATA and in neighbouring Malakand division in
NWFP.24 This religious revolt by Pakistani extremists who were supported by
Afghan Taliban fighters who had crossed the border was crushed by the army.25 A
few years later, the TNSM confirmed yet again its ideological links and affinity
with the Afghan Taliban when some 10,000 of its armed cadres from Bajaur, Swat
and other neighbouring areas, led by Sufi Muhammad, crossed the border into
Afghanistan in late 2001 to assist the fleeing Taliban forces fight the US-led forces
and to thank them for their earlier support.26
Another complicating factor in the Afghan-Pakistan relationship at the time
was the thriving heroin trade, which involved a major tribe, the Afridi, whose
members straddle the Durand Line in the area of the Khyber pass. The drug smug-
glers were given military and moral support by the Soviet-backed Afghan govern-
ment in return for the Afridi's support in stopping the crossing into Afghanistan
of the mujahideen. under intense western pressure to do something about this
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growing heroin trade, General Zia-ul-Haq sent paramilitary forces into the Khyber
Agency in 1985. Moreover, with the aim of preventing a resurgence of the illicit
trade and check arms smuggling, the government decided to permanently station
law enforcement agents in the agency and build fortified posts in strategic loca-
tions.27 This marked the beginning of the central authoiities, rezular militarv
interference in FATA.
There was some support for the military action, as there was a genuine senti-
ment that something had to be done to arrest the heroin trade. But there was also
a feeling that the root cause of the heroin problem in FATA was the continued
implementation of the Frontiers crime regulations, the lack of universal adult
franchise, the lack of social and political integration with the rest of the counrry
and the low level of development, which only benefited a few malil6.2a Benazir
Bhutto's civilian govemment attempted to deal with some of these issues by intro-
ducing adult franchise in FATA in 1996. However, Bhutto's political liberaliza-
tion only went so far. Political parties were - and still are - formally forbidden
from extending their activities into the agencies. However, mullahs have always
enjoyed free entry. This assisted the Islamic parties to further consolidate their
political influence in the area.
Importantly, even during the civilian governments of the 1990s, the military
continued to usethe madrassa-educatedjihadists,mostbut not all based in FATA,
as proxies to fight in Indian-held Kashmir or to assist the Taliban in Afghanistan,
and these radical Sunni groups continued to grow in strength and in numbers
throughout Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did however try to move
against some of the more radical Sunni groups, particularly the sipah-i-sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) (an offshoot of the SSp) in t99g-99.
while manyTihadists were arrested, rily more fled across the border to find
refuge in Afghanistan. Most of these eventually returned to pakistan following the
ouster of the Taliban from power in2}0l.2e
The third period: 2001-2008
Following their ouster in october 2001, the Taliban and Al-eaeda fighters escaped
across the border into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Hundreds of these fighters -
Afghans, Pakistanis, chechens, uzbeks, Arabs and uyghurs - settled and married
into local tribes. They established safe havens in FATA, especially in South and
North waziristan and Bajaur agencies, and from there launched attacks against
western forces in southern and eastem Afghanistan with success, particularly
from 2005 onwards. while most of the Taliban fighters remained in the hibal
areas, mrury Al-Qaeda operatives settled in other parts of pakistan. This was
confirmed with the subsequent arrest of top Al-Qaeda leaders in Balochistan,
Sindh and Punjab.3o
Part of the Pakhtun's tribal honour is to offer hospitality, regardless whether the
guest is welcomed or not, a criminal, a friend or an enemy. Accordingly, it was
easy for these militants to settle down in FATA. Nevertheless. it has become
obvious in the last few years that some of these militants, particularly the
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non-Pakhtun, are starting to overstay their welcome. For example, deadly battles
causing scores offatalities broke out between the local residents and these non-
Pakhtuns, particularly in early 2007.31
Notwithstanding some local differences, an Afghan Taliban mini-state was
established in the tribal areas. This progressively led to the Talibanization of
FATA, and increasingly into the non-tribal areas of NWFP, by Pakistani militants
and religious extremists who shared the same religious beliefs as the Afghan
Taliban. This included imposing shariah law, attacking music and video shops,
closing barber shops and killing women working in schools or for NGOs. From
then on it did not take much for the pro-Taliban Pakistani militants to flex their
muscles, including assassinating politicians, killing innocent Pakistani civilians,
murdering tribal leaders who disagreed with the militants' political agenda,
attacking army personnel and assassinating govemment officials, including by
using suicide bombers. This Talibanization of parts of Pakistan continues today
and should come as no surprise to anyone as it is a logical continuation of the
Sunni Deobandi militancy whose ideological tenets are derived from the same
orthodox Sunni-Hannafi interpretations of Islam which were promoted under
General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization process of the 1980s.32
So who are these pro-Taliban fighters in the tribal areas? Simply put, they are
Pakhtun tribesmen who have been radicalized by the rhetoric of jihad which
started almost 30 years ago with the anti-Soviet jihad, continued during the
Afghan civil war and the subsequent Taliban rule and finally today with the pres-
ence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the region. These pro-Taliban fighters also
include retuming Pakistani fighters and commanders who had participated in
fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets and later, between 1996 and 2001,
against the Northern Alliance.3r Worryingly, an increasing number of Punjabi
militants, especially from the southern part of the province, have also joined
forces with these Pakhtun militants. Many of these Punjabis already belonged to
banned extremist religious militant groups which were - and some still are -
suppoded behind the scenes by elements of the Pakistani military establishment.
These groups, which include Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
(LJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkatul Jihadul
Islami (HUJI), are sometimes referred to collectively as the Punjabi Taliban.3a
These groups have played an extremely useful role for the Pakistani military as
Jihadi proxies' in Afghanistan and India since the 1980s.35 However, since 2001
these Punjabi-based groups have increasingly turned their attention away from the
Kashmir issue and focused on spreading terror in the Punjab and Karachi.36 So
while the LeT - now renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa after President Musharraf banned
the organization in 2002 - has not completely abandoned its attacks against Indian
targets as confirmed with its suicide attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, it is
now increasingly concentrating its attention on the home front. And even though
it is considered one of the most extreme jihadist groups in Pakistan today, it is still
allowed to openly operate in the country.37
The common thread between all these different militants, regardless of their
ethnic or national origin, is their belief that it is lawful to wage jihad against a
government or
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government or other fellow Muslims who support the west's 'war on terror'.
Importantly, many unemployed youth have been drawn to the jihad'as a way of
gaining a livelihood or enhancing their social importance and power'.38 This is
padicularly worrisome especially for Pakistan with such alargeunemployed (and
often unemployable) youth population. Finally, all these pakistani militants coop-
erate closely with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda.3e This terrorist cooperation
goes back to the 1990s when some of these groups, particularly the LJ, went to
Afghanistan to avoid arrest from the Pakistan authorities. There they established
training camps and worked closely with the Taliban and Al-eaeda to become
members of the globalTihadist network.{
In an attempt to bring together the various Taliban-oriented groups of the tribal
areas under one umbrella organization, a shura (assembly) of 40 senior Taliban
leaders established on 14 December 2007 the Tehrik-i-Taliban pakistan (TTp)
headed by Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP demanded an immediate end to military
operations by the Pakistani army and the withdrawal of troops from FATA. It also
declared a more intense jihad against US and NATo forces in Afghanistan as well
as its goal to enforce shariah law in the areas under its influence.ar An important
member of the TTP is the TNSM, which we discussed above and which would
eventually create a lot of trouble for the Pakistan government in 2009. An impor-
tant point to remember about the TTP is that, while it is based in FATA and parts
ofNWFP, Pakhtun ethno-nationalismhas notbeen specifically and systematically
used to attract new recruits. And this is because its main focus is Islam - as they
interpret it. Moreover, on a more practical level, were they to stress Pakhtun iden-
tity it would deprive the TTP of potential sources of income and manpower
support from other parts ofPakistan and beyond.a2
The establishment of the TTP, however, could give the misleading impression
that there is a unified and centralizedorganization to which all the militant groups
in Pakistan answer to, similar to the Afghan Taliban. This is certainly not the case.
On the contrary, not only is the FATA-based TTP itself not a disciplined, well-
controlled and homogeneous grouping, but it is characterized by much in-fighting,
often, but not solely, along tribal and sub-tribal affiliation. This was particularly
the case following the death of Baittulah Mehsud in an American drone attack in
August 2009. The selection of his successor was a long and difficult process,
which confirmed the deep-seated differences between the various groups making
up the TTP. Eventually the succession went to Hakimullah Mehsud, a friend and
close aide to Baitullah and known for his ruthless approach to dealing with his
opponents, whether Pakistani officials or other militant leaders.a3 One major rift
among TTP members is the approach they take vis-d-vis the Pakistan army. A
number of prominent militant leaders, such as Turkistan Bittani and Faqir
Mohammad,a are opposed to attacking Pakistani troops and prefer to focus on
assisting the Afghan Talibans' jihad against Western forces in Afghanistan.
Others, such as the late Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. have no
compunction in targeting the Pakistani military and government officials.as
There are other militant Islamist groups based in FATA which are not part of
the TTP but are lumped together and referred to collectively as the Pakistani
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Taliban. The most important ones include Laskar-e-Islam, headed by Mangal
Bagh, which is based in the Khyber Agency, and Ansar-ul-Islam, which is a
Barelvi Sunni group, also based in the Khyber Agency. As these two extremist
groups belong to the two main competing sunni schools of thought in pakistan,
Deobandi and Barelvi, their members not only target Shias (whom they consider
beyond the pale),46 non-Muslims (especially AhmidiyahsaT and christians) and
Pakistani authorities, but also each other.
Finally, there are militants in FATA and NWFp with whom the pakistan
govemments of President Musharraf and president zardan have overt or tacit
agreements of convenience because they play what the military considers impor-
tant strategic roles. The two most important of such militant leaders are Maulvi
Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. They have not only been ardent rivals of Baitullah
Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, but they have opposed the TTp's policy of
targeting the Pakistan military and other state symbols. Moreover, they have been
strong supporters of the Afghan Haqqani network, which is a ruthless group based
in North waziristan whose fighters have been very successful in the attacks they
have launched against western forces in Afghanistan. This association between
these Pakistani militants and Haqqani has been useful to the pakistani military
because the latter has some important intelligence and military links with the
Haqqani militants developed since the days of the Soviets' occupation of
Afghanistan. It cercainly does not want to lose such an important Afghan asset,
which could be particularly useful following the eventual departure of the western
forces from Afghanistan. The Haqqani network is also valuable to the pakistan
military because its top leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the main liaison with the
Afghan Taliban based in Quetta, Baluchistan, other pakistani militants and
Al-Qaeda.a8
under intense American pressure, President pewez Musharraf sent about
100,000 arrny troops into the tribal areas to hunt down the Taliban and Al-eaeda
fighters. The government also erected fences in selected areas along the border
and set up some 1,000 checkpoints. It organized the formation of anti-militant
lashkars (militias), comprising volunteers, in the hibal areas and in the .settled'
areas of NWFP.ae while the army has lost more troops in the process than western
forces have in Afghanistan, the military has generally been more effective and
keener in going after the non-Pakhtun Al-eaeda than after the Afghan Taliban.5'
And this was (and still is) principally because the military - which had developed
close links with the Taliban since the early 1990s when it had created it with the
help of the Islamic parties - did not wish to destroy a potential ally after the
inevitable departure of the Coalition forces from Afghanistan.sr
Unfortunately, not only did the Pakistan army suffer a very high number of
military casualties and fatalities, but in the process of using military means it also
killed many innocent civilians. This has - and continues to provide - political
ammunition to the Pakistani Taliban militants in the tribal areas. Similarly, the use
of American Predator strikes - often unilaterally without the pakistan govem-
ment's prior agreement - has fuelled an already strong anti-American mood in
Pakistan, in general, and in the tribal areas, in particular.
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A negative consequence of the use of the military has been the gradual political
displacement of the Political Agent and the maliks, who kept the system working,
in favour of the Pakistani raliban militants, who have established aparallel system
of administration, justice, summary hial courts and taxation in the tribal areas.52
And the breakdown of the tribal structure has been reinforced with the influence
of the Islamic parties and the presence of the Taliban and Al-eaeda, whose
fighters have executed tribal leaders who disagreed with their policy or agenda.
As we noted above, this breakdown of the traditional kibal structure had already
begun with the influx of the mujahideen and the displacement of the matiks in
favour of the mullahs in the 1980s.
Realizing that the deployrnent of armed forces was not effective in dealing with
these sanctuaries, the Musharraf government decided to try a different approach.
Accordingly, it entered into agreements with local leaders and mullahs in South
Waziristan (April 2004 and February 2005) and North Waziristan (September
2006). These deals called on the tribesmen to expel the foreign militants and end
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan in return for the army stopping major oper-
ations in those agencies and pulling most of its soldiers out of the tribal area. The
accords were a failure, as there were more attacks across into Afghanistan
following those agreements and the Taliban maintained its sanctuaries.
Furthermore, the Pakistani militants continued to rule in North and South
Waziristan, killing and attacking officials and military personnel at will. The
major flaws with the deals were: first, it assumed that the hibes conholled
the areas when in fact the Taliban did; and, second, there were no enforcement
provisions.
However, in July 2007 one event was the catalyst for the beginning of signifi-
cant militant activity against the Pakistan state: the siege of Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad by radical mullahs who wanted to impose shariah in the
capital and which ended with the army storming the mosque and killing scores of
people in the process. The people of Pakistan had great difficulty reconciling
themselves with this event, which took place in the very heart of the counfiry's
capital. It confirmed in the eyes of the public that successive national governments
had been too tolerant towards these radical religious groups and that something
had to be done to stop their power from growing. It also demonstrated thatlhe de
facto alliance between the military and the mullahs had not only broken down but
that it had given the religious extremists the political space to grow.
The fourth period: 2008-present
Since about 2008 Pakistan has undergone significant political changes at the
centre which have had an impact on the Pakistan govemment's approach to
dealing with the militancy. In February 2008, parliamentary elections were held in
which the late Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won the most seats, and
in August Pewez Musharraf resigned as president,s3 to be replaced by Bhutto's
widow, Asif Zardai. With the change in political leadership also came a change
of attitude towards the militant threat. While General Musharraf had officially
,
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joined the west's 'waf, on terror', his administration,s approach to this battle
against terrorists was at best inefficient and at worst dupliiiious. However, with
the change of the guard in the military and politicar spheres, there was also a
change of attitude towards this worsening home-grown militancy. But this did not
happen quickly.
Even though the agreements in North and South waziristan failed, the military
mistakenly believed that agreements could still be entered into with ihe militants.
Accordingly, not only did the pakistan govemment release on 2r April 200g
Maulana Sufi Mohammad, leader of the TNSM, whose armed activities have been
discussed above, but also sigrred an accord, dubbed the , shariah for peace' agree-
ment with the TNSM in February 2009. The agreement consisted of enfoicing
rhe shariah in the swat valley region and in retum the TNSM followers would
renounce violence. However, the TNSM militants did not lay down their
weapons and instead attacked the surrounding districts of Dir and Buner.ro Given
that this militant activity was taking place only about 150 kilometres from
Islamabad, the army decided to act. It sent in some 40,000 troops and managed to
expel the fighters from the towns in the Swat valley, most ofihom simply fled
to FATA' especially South waziristan and orakzai agencies. However, this
military assault came at a great price for the civilian populution. some 2.5 million
people had to flee the heavy fighting and seek refuge elsewhere. This was
the world's biggest and most sudden movement or peopte since the Rwandan
genocide in1994.55
The reneging of the swat accord was a turning point for the military as it finally
confirmed that there was no point in signing agreements with the militants as they
would simply break them. The government henceforth determined to deal force-
fully with the militants. Accordingly, following the army,s intervention into Swat,
it decided to also go into south waziristan and orakzai in the second half of 2009
and in the first half of 2010. It is important to remember that the US administra-
tions of Presidents Bush and obama had been pressing hard for the pakistani
government to take forceful action against the Taliban and the pakistani militants
hiding in those areas of FATA.56 Given the harsh terrain and the dispersion of the
militants' forces, the military operations were difficult to execute. And while
the army did score some tactical victories and eliminated many militants, most of
the TTP fighters fled to North waziristan. Nevertheless, the b*irturri army has
declared victory in these operations, even though the evidence on the ground
suggests quite the contrary.s7 Nevertheless, in May the pakistani govemment
decided in principle to laurch a full-fledged military operation again-st he mili-
tants hiding in North waziristan. while this decision was taken- reluctantly in
response to persistent American pressure on the pakistan authorities to go into
North waziristan, it is nevertheless an important development in the pakistani
government's determination to deal with the jihadisr mililancy threat facing the
country.s8
In addition to using military means to deal with the militants in the tribal areas,
the civilian govemment in Islamabad is developing political and socio-economic
prograrnmes to bring the tribal areas into mainstream pakistan political and
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economic life. washington's aid package of US$7.5 billion over the next five
years aims to assist Islamabad meet some of these economic development needs.
The government's approach also includes negotiations with Pakistani militants
willing to put down their arms.se However, we have seen that the success rate for
that is poor. The government's aim is to convince the local population, through
non-lethal measures, that there is much more to be gained forihim by being fully
integrated with the rest of Pakistan than by supporting the Taliban. As in parts of
southern and eastem Afghanistan today, local residents have acquiesced to
Taliban-type rule out of fear of the militants combined with resentment against a
comrpt administration and draconian laws. The Pakistani militants are able to
restore order quickly and dispense speedyjustice - as they see it.60
Two of the measures the federal government is considering to induce the locals
to drop their support for the Taliban and their fellow travellers are repealing the
Frontiers Crimes Regulations (FCR) in FATA and fully integrating politically the
tribal areas into the neighbouring province of NWFP. Renaming NWFP 'Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa' is a positive step in that direction. While there has been some oppo-
sition to the repeal of the FCR in some quarters, these are measures that are on
the whole welcomed by the local residents of FATA.6I Importantly, following the
Islamic parties' crushing defeat in the 2008 provincial and national elections, the
militants can no longer rely on their political support to promote their agenda.62
The people of NWFP have made very clear that they reject religious extremism.
And more importantly, they have also rejected the religious parties' comrpt and
incompetent rule in NWFP.
Conclusion
Pakistan is faced with a growing religious militancy threat, with some 3,000
people killed in terrorist attacks over the last three years. While this militancy is
still dominated by Pakhtuns and its home base is FATA, it has increasingly taken
on board other ethnic groups and moved beyond the tribal areas and into other
parts of the country. And although these extremist Sunni Deobandi groups - the
TTP, other militant groups and regionalTihadists - are not about to take over the
state, they are nevertheless gaining ground. In many ways, this militancy problem
is an extreme manifestation of the unresolved issue - around since 1947 - of the
role Islam should have in the administration of the country.
This militancy problem has been compounded by the presence in Pakistan,
mainly, but not solely, in FATA, of the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda since
October 2001. All these groups, indigenous and foreign, have helped each other
and have cross-pollinated for years. Nevertheless, civilian and military govern-
ments in Pakistan have tried to artificially differentiate between 'good' terrorists,
such as the LeT, who act as proxies on the Kashmir front, and 'bad' terrorists,
such as the TTP and the LJ, who threaten civilians and the state alike. The problem
with that policy is that it assumes that the constituent members of these two group-
ings are clearly separate and that their agendas have remained the same over time.
This is far from being the case; the 'good' and 'bad' terrorists have increasingly
150 Claude Rakisits
been,working together, the. membership of these groupings is fluid and theiragenda and targets have evolved over time.
A critical factor that has assisted the growth of this militancy is the failure sincethe creation of pakistan to integrate rara pohtically, legally and economically
with the rest of the country. This has hadihree negative consequences: it hasmade it easier for foreign elements to embed themselves in the tribal areas _ a safephysical environment, with its rugged terrain and difficult access for the pakistan
army; it has meant that the local pakhtuns have had no stake in the development
of Pakistan; and it has made it easier to recruit disaffected locals to the jihadist
cause.
But Pakistan does not exist in a vacuum. Developments in pakistan are intrinsi_
cally linked to events in Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is in putirturi, long-term
national interest for the 
-army to vigorously and'unswervingly hunt down the
frsh* Taliban, Al-eaeda and their pakistani allies uno prrri*"ntry shut downtheir network in pakistan while at the same time extending democratic freedoms,
upholding human rights, extending the rule of ta* ana"promoiinf sustainaule
economic development for the residents of the tribal areas.
Needless to say, the negative blowback effect on pakistan of a Taliban victoryin Afghanistan would be immeasurable. It would encourage and invigorate thePakistani militants' But, importantly, a Taliban-dominatedlovernment in Kabul
- probably harbouring Al-Qaeda - would not necessarily be iriendly to Islamabad.
on the contrary, it would not be sympathetic to a pakistan government officially
an ally of the west. The civilian govirnment must now use its popular mandate
- and the people's rejection of the Islamic parties - to assist the people of the hibal
areas to integrate economically and politically with the rest of pakistan. That
would be a good first step towards dealing with the militancy ,"o*g" fa"irrgPakistan.
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